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PREFACE 
The author has made an attempt in this work to set 
forth in detail and trace the development of the rela-
tions between the United States and the leading European 
powers from January 1, 1915, to May 29, 1915. He has 
also endeavored to give an unbiased opinion of the fac-
tors which lead .America to become pro-iuly, and to pre-
sent the facts leading up to the sinking of the Lusitania 
in the light of all the available information. A great 
deal of attention has been given in the first part of the 
work in showing how the underlying causes of the United 
States entanglement were being laid without the average 
.American being conscious of it. 
A large portion of the thesis is devoted entirely 
to the last voyage and the sinking of the Lusitania. 
With the details of the disaster in mind, the writer 
has made a sincere effort to set forth the true facts 
in regard to the causes and effects of the sinking. In 
doing this it has been necessary to search carefully 
through the diplomatic correspondence to be found in 
the Foreign Relation Su~hlements of the United States 
for 1914, 1915, 1916. e Life and Ietters of Waiter 
Hines Page, of Colonel House, and of WilliamJennings 
Bryan were used frequently. A number of books by out-
standing authorities on the submarine activities during 
the early part of the war were used for contiguous in-
formation. The leading magazines and journals have 
been read for facts concerning the sinking of the 
Lusitania. 
Most of the sources and materials used in prepar-
ation of this thesis have been found in the Oklahoma 
Agricultural and Mechanical College Library. 
Oklahoma A. and M. College 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
May 3, 193?. 
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CRAFTER I 
NEUTRALITY BECOMES DIFFICULT 
On December 29, 1914, .Ambassador Gerard was in Berlin, 
writing a letter to Colonel House that nprospeots of peace 
seem very dim." At the same time the possibility that the 
United States might be drawn into the conflict was a matter 
of pure prophecy, and those who may have anticipated American 
participation in the war were very few. Even, at this early 
date, our English -friends were becoming impatient with our 
continued neutrality. We might be able to see that the Germ.an 
military regime was in direct conflict with some of the prin-
ciples of democracy, but it does not seem reasonable that 
the Allies could have expected us to become involved in suoh 
savage cruelty. Unquestionably this attitude was generally 
accepted throughout the United States. Yet at that moment we 
were in the midst of an evolutionary process which had estab-
lished the chief causes of our entanglement and war was more 
than a matter of speculation. 
In his address tQ Congress on December 8, 1914, President 
Wilson spoke of the war as one "with which we have nothing to 
do ••••• We shall not alter our attitude because some amongst us 
are nervous and excited.u1 By the beginning of the new year 
he had begun a modification of this view, because it was his 
lWoodrow Wilson, Wilson's State Papers~ Addresses, 
New York, 1918, pp. 78,79. 
2 
duty to 1'ind a satisfactory solution. theoretically, there 
were a number of solutions from which to choose, such as 
impartial intervention to force a peace, intervention on the 
side of Germany, strict and effective neutrality, and inter-
vention in alliance with the Entente. The course finally 
adopted was an attempt to follow them all. This made it very 
difficult to succeed with any. Unfortunately the longer we 
waited the fewer the paths and the smaller the field within 
which our diplomats could act. Within a very short time we 
were finding that our indecision had made it impossible to 
carry out our intended policies. Well was this expressed when 
Colonel House said, "last autumn •••• was the time," when we 
should have acted if we desired to remain at peace. Soon our 
statesmen found themselves struggling with forces, which they 
were unable to control. And under their leadership and guid-
ance we were to become the victim of circumstances rather than 
the master of our destiny. 2 
Such conditions were apparently not foreseen at the 
beginning of the new year. Even the nearness of the indus-
trial centers of the New England States to the war left little 
impression upon the New Year Eve celebrants. Despite the war 
and blockade money flowed freely in hotels and restaurants. 
For example, New York City celebrated New Year Eve by drinking 
real champagne and singing war songs; journalists proclaimed 
it "Broadway's Largest Crowd." 
2vfalter Millis,~ !2. ~' New York, 1935, p. 123. 
3 
These brief moments of emotional expres s ion were possibly 
due to wishful t h inking . During J anua ry, 1915, according to 
a later survey, industries a ctually sho wed no sign of increasing 
prosperity. 3 Bank checks drawn during the first quarter of 
1915 were ten percent smaller t llan the simila r period in 1914. 
Prices for all commodities were exceed i ngl y low, with the ex-
ception of whea t, which W::J. s at startling highs. Then, 1i ha t was 
to be our rev; ard, for being at peace in a warring vJorld ? Ap-
parently no ma teria l good was forthcoming f or s o perfect an 
example of pacifism. The f a ct tha t t he war had cost t he United 
4 
States f 382,000, 000 in decr ea s ed exports up to December 1, 1914, 
seems to have worried the pu blishers of t he New York Times very 
little. This newspape r conveyed the idea tha t our stored up 
forces of production ,. oul d soon penetra te the world's markets 
to an exten t we had seldom dreamed , and tha t 1J hat other nations 
are str i v ing to obt 8. in t hrough f or ce, vie shall obta in by ex-
5 
tend ing our benevo l ence . 
Such lofty idea s had not been intendeJ to soften the 
shock which was sur e to 80me to the British on t he publication 
of s o strenuous an American protest aga inst British t rade 
restrictions . When the average Britisher read t hese grievances 
in his ne wspapers he did not a ccept t hem with favor or uncon-
cern. To the publi c of bo t h na tions, it came as t he f' irst 
import 3.n t officia l a c t ion in regard to the European \'1ar. 
3Alexander Dana Noyes , The ,Var Feriod of American 
Finance, New York, 1926, p. 114. 
4 11 The Europe an ':lar ," New York Times Cur :- en t Hi story Mag-
azine, New York, 1915, II, 1016, herea fter referred to a s 
N.Y. Timmes Curr. Hist. 
5Millis, Roa d To Vlar , p . 124 . 
' 
4 
The significance lies in the fact that it was not directed 
to Germany but to the Allies: 
In a letter of January 12, our Ambassador (Page) to 
Great Britain wrote the President that the majority of the 
people of England never makes a "distinction between com-
munication that comes from the State Department and com-
munications the newspapers say come with your (Wilson) ap-
proval. At the same time, he made it known that he was 
grieved by the "shirt~sleeve" tone of the State Department. 6 
Some of the statesmen and even the British press could 
not quite understand why the invasion of Belgium had not 
I 
affected our national interests while the suppression of our 
trade had called numerous protests. Spring Rice, the British 
.Ambassador to the United States, was so enraged by this same 
feeling that he was quite certain that all .America was fast 
becoming pro-German; thereby, he created "an attitude of 
partiality in the present war and of hostility to Great 
Britain."7 
The British and Germans alike were free to buy munitions 
in the United States; the difference was that Britain could 
take them home and Germany could not. Since Germany could 
not get munitions, she believed it would be only fair that 
6Burton J. Hendricks, The Life and Letters of Walter · 
Hines Page, New York, ~6-;-TII:-219. -
7Forei~n Relations of the United States, 1915 Supplement, 
pp. 77 -?79. Hereafter'r'eferred to as £:2!:• Rel., Suppl. 
5 
the Allies should be prevented from buying by our Government. 
The German-Americans presently made an appeal to Congress to 
"lay an embargo upon all contraband of war {i3aving and excepting 
foodstuffs alone], and thereby withdraw from the contending 
powers all aid and assistance of this Republic." With this 
demand, the German-Americans were able to get a Senator, who 
had a large constituency of their racial sympathizers to make 
the complaints. Senator Stone of Missouri, on January 8, 
addressed a long letter to Secretary of State Bryan, enumerating 
in twenty points the ways in which it was charged that the Ad-
ministration had shown partiality for the Entente. 8 To this 
connnunication the State Department Secretary soon replied: 
If Germany and Austria-Hungary cannot import contra-
band from this country it is not •••• the duty of the 
United States to close its markets to the Allies. 
The markets of this country are open upon equal terms 
to all the world, to every nation, belligerent or neu-
tral.9 
That answer was very conclusive, but it settled nothing. 
There were still good indications that Congress might pass 
the arms embargo resolution. 
Miss Jane Addams and some of her companions were labor-
ing with officials of the European Governments to secure 
peace. Miss Addams called on Foreign Minister Grey in London, 
Minister Jagow in Berlin, and other foreign ministers in 
various belligerent nations. Colonel House said Miss Addams 
8.Ma.rk. Sullivan, .QE Times, New York, 1933, V, 93. 
9~., p. 13. 
6 
had "accumulated a wonderful lot of misinformation," that the 
foreign ministers with whom she had talked "were not quite 
candid with her," and that she "had a totally wrong impression." 
The information secured from the ministers was given to 
:Mme. Rosika Schwimmer who visited Wilson to solicit him for 
peace, which, she asserted, the belligerents would welcome. 
Wilson was interested, but nonoonnnittal. 
Undaunted by her polite rebuff a journey to Detroit was 
made with the hope of obtaining an interview with Henry Ford. 
It was the psychological moment; he was eager for her per-
suasions. Ford approved heartily of the mediation plan and 
promised not only to support it, but to go to Europe himself 
and take part in it. In a few days he went to New York City 
and chartered the Scandinavian liner, Oscar II. 
Mr. Ford invited several friendly Governors, Senators 
and various college groups to accompany him on this peace 
tour. Unfortunately for Mr. Ford, the newspapers were living 
up to their reputation when they made this attempt at peace an 
occasion for ridicule. So much 111 feeling was in this way 
engendered that few individuals cared to participate in such 
a futile enterprise. 
In the absence of his chosen few he secured a great number 
of people who were in sympathy with his plan, but who were less 
in1'luential. The peace delegates made their tour to the dif'fer-
ent nations with no success. The rebuff administered to these 
foreign mediators was so severe that other peace movements in 
7 
the country lost their force of conviction.10 
During all this period ex-President Roosevelt, who was 
aging and jealous, had become very unsympathetic to President 
Wilson's traditional policy of neutrality. Mr. Roosevelt not 
only disagreed with Wilson, but he went so far as to disregard 
the established policies of Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe, 
and announced a policy as urastic as that to which Wilson was 
long afterwards to become attached. His (Roosevelt) flaming 
manifesto, "Utopia or Hell," appeared on January 4, in the 
Independent: 
The only alternative to war, that is to hell, is the 
adoption of some plan substantially like that which I 
have advooated ••••• It is possible that after this war 
had come to an end the European contestants will be 
sufficiently sobered to be willing to consider some such 
proposal ••••• vVhat I propose is a working and realizable 
Utopia. My proposal is that the efficient civilized 
nations--should join in a world league for the peace of 
righteousness. That means that they shall by solemn 
cov~nant agree as to their respective rights, which 
shall not be questioned; that they shall agree that all 
other questions arising between them shall be submitted 
to a court of arbitration. And that they shall also 
agree--to act with the combined military strrigth of 
all of them against any recalcitrant nation. 
Af'ter the war (1919), when President Wilson produced a 
similar proposal, even using some of the same words with the 
hope of getting his .Article sanctioned, "the vital and es-
sential part of the whole system," Mr. Roosevelt was no 
longer alive. But little had the latter dreamed or foreseen 
lOsullivan, op. cit., p. 162 ff. 
llTheodore Roosevelt, "Utopia or Hell": Independent, 
New York, 1915, LXXXI. 
8 
his enemy adopting his ideas in playing the leading role in 
such a solemn undertaking. 
Perhaps this Roosevelt internationalistic spirit assisted 
in confirming Wilson in his own neutrality plan. At least a 
strong intimation was indicated in his President Jackson Day 
address at Indianapolis, on January 8, when he said he pre-
ferred that our thoughts should not too often cross the ocean , · 
and besought the citizens of the United States to "keep their 
1 d d "12 mora pow er ry ••••• 
If the President succeeded in keeping his own moral 
powder dry, his most intimate friend, Colonel House, did not. 
Colonel House had already sensed the military deadlock between 
the belligerents, and he was longing for a peaceful solution to 
settle the terrible struggle. Having been rebuffed on three 
-former peace overtures his fourth was now attempted. He was 
convinced that the Central Powers were ready for peace on 
terms which would be favorable for the British to accept, if 
only Sir Edward Grey could be induced to put pressure on .ti'rance 
and Russia. :turthermore, he indicated that "if German:y should 
make a peace offer (at this time) which was not sympathetically 
received by the Entente, neutral sentiment would veer against 
them." 
In a brief pre-dinner conversation with the president on 
January 12, Colonel House was given permission to give his 
l2vf11son, 21.?.• cit., pp. 80-94. 
9 
fourth plan a trial. To do this it was decided that he should 
go to Europe on January 30. They were apparently convinced 
that "it was time to deal directly with the principals." 
After dinner, much to the disappointment of Colonel House, the 
President instead of resuming the vital pre-dinner subject, 
read aloud to the family from a book of current fiction. House 
said, "I was surprised that he preferred to do this rather 
than discuss the matters of importance." Evidently the Presi-
dent was confident of his unofficial ambassador's ability to 
do the work. 13 
When the Colonel approached Cecil Spring Rice on the 
following day he found him in a "sulky mood." Sir Cecil 
indicated that the "Allies would not receive the good office 
of the President cordially," but the Colonel got him in a 
better mood by telling him that the United State-a intended to 
throw its "moral strength in behalf of a permanent settlement." 
Sir Cecil told the Colonel he had "hit the nail on the head," 
and insisted that the matter be explained to the Russian and 
French .Ambassadors. It was agreed that all four of the 
officials should meet at Phillipa's (a coffee house frequented 
by statesmen) at four o'clock. 
At the scheduled time the invited guest arrived. With 
considerable forethought the setting was planned, but much 
to the chagrin of our peace agent, Jus~erand and Bakhmetieff 
13charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 
Boston and New York7°i'926, I, 350. 
10 
(the French and Russian Ambassadors) accepted with many con-
ditions the idea. Later, he was able to bring them around to 
see "that it would be worth while to find how utterly unre-
liable and treacherous the Germans were by imposing their 
false pretense to the world." They could now see the like-
lihood of a negative or unsatisfactory answer from the Central 
Powers, which if their reasoning was correct would definitely 
align the United States with them. Under these conditions both 
Ambassadors were anxious for the Colonel to visit Paris and 
Petrograd after a visit in London. Thus, the Colonel's mission 
had been adroitly transformed, even before it began, from an 
intervention in behalf of peace into an intervention on the 
side of the Allies. Still the President with all these new 
developments in mind was willing for the Colonel to go. When 
it was time for him to leave, President Wilson showed his 
loyalty by going to the station to see him off, and his affec-
tion by tearful eyes and last words of farewe11.14 . On 
January 30, Colonel House sailed from New York upon the 
Lusitania. 
While Colonel House departed to work for peace, other 
forces were working in the opposite direotion. Already the 
Morgan Company's representative to London had been favorably 
received by the British Ministers who expressed their thanks 
for the fine consideration the British purchasers had received 
14 Seymour, ...QI>. cit. , pp. 51, 58. 
11 
in .America. Next to J.P. Morgan, the .American business man 
who was best known in England, was Charles M. Schwab of the 
Bethlehem Steel Company now "vacationing" in England·. Ere 
long we find Lord Kitchener (British Secretary of War) and 
Mr. Schwab cloistered in the British War Of'f'ice. At the 
end of several days 01' conference, Kitchener informed Schwab 
that he had a fear that German interests might purchase the 
Bethlehem Steel Company. Schwab immediately offered to sign 
an agreement that the Bethlehem Company would not be sold to 
15 any one so long as i~ had any British contracts under way. 
Some of the t'irst fruits of :Mr. Schwab's activities 
in Pennsylvania were already available. The White Star 
Liner Orduna sailed on January 16, from New York carrying 
155 peaceable passengers and two fourteen-inch guns lashed 
16 in full view upon her main deck. 
Moreover, if the munition supplies were just beginning 
to develop, other commodities had been pouring into the 
Entente countries in ever increasing volume. From this time 
on, the trade to Germany rapidly declined. The Senators, 
representing the cotton interests of the south, began to make 
vigorous protests. The Ship Bill, which was backed by 8ec-
retary of the Treasury McAdoo, made one attempt to strike 
at the center of the whole difficulty. This· bill provided 
for the purchase and operation of a fleet of merchant vessels 
15John Moody, "The Masters Of Uapital": ~ American 
Chronicles, New Haven, 1919, XLI, 16?-168. 
~6Millis, .2E.• cit., p. 129. 
12 
by the united utates Government. 17 Had the transaction, pro-
vided by the bill, been made, our trade relationship with 
Germany would have been strengthened. The interned German 
liners, however, were almost the only ships available for 
purchase, which fact unfortunately, the Republicans made a 
political issue in the ensuing campaign, and set themselves 
to talk the Democratic ship bill to death. 18 
Through the concealed efforts of the German Embassy, 
private citizens made two attempts to break the blockade. 
The German ship Dacia ·was transferred from the Hamburg-
.American Line to a bona Xide .American citizen, who later 
under the .American flag and registry, dispatched it with a 
cotton cargo to Germany. On January 5, the State Department 
received a memorandum from the British Embassy pointing out 
that "His Majesty's Government must reserve its rights· as 
to the recognition of the validity or- the transfer ••••• " 
The British allowed the Dacia to be captured by the French, 
19 
who were still on good terms with the United States. 
To test the Allied contention that food was not being 
denied the civilian population of Germany, the Wilhelmina 
of the w. L. Greem Commission Company of the United States was 
consigned ·to the f irm's own representative, an .American citi-
zen, in Hamburg. The ship's cargo "consisted entirely of 
foodstuff." The manager in Europe had "instructions to sell 
17con!ressional Record, 63 Congress, 2nd. Session, LI 
part 6, p. 16256. 
l8Mi1lis, £I?.•.£!!•, P• 130. 
19 For.~., 1915 Suppl., p. ?74. 
13 
20 the cargo solely to the civilian population of Hamburg." 
Despite these conditions the ship was brought to the Prize 
Court of England for investigation~ Although the Government 
of the United States would have a strong position if it had 
contested the matter, it refrained from intervening, as did 
the German Government. 
Since the United States was content to sit idly and 
permit all her trade rights to go by default, it was left up 
to the G-ermans to act for themselves. The significant ques-
tion with which the German authorities were confronted was 
whether -they should, or should not, declare a submarine war 
against British commerce. 
From Berlin the .American Ambassador (Gerard) reported 
that he had been in conference with Zimmermann, the Under-
secretary of Foreign Affairs, who expressed himself as being 
unconcerned with reference to possible trouble with the 
United States. He believed, that even though complications 
should develop, matters would not be worse for Germany than 
the existing state of affairs. In case of trouble, he be-
lieved, that "the many thousands 01' trained Germans in 
America would join the Irish and start a revolution."21 The 
Germans were conscious that the submarine might mean a break 
with America. Although Mr. Wilson had acquiesced when the 
British declared the North Sea a "war zone," Germany was not 
20Although the Wilhelmina's cargo was seized, the British 
paid for it in the end,~ •• p. 105. 
21 Seymour, 2£• .£!!•, p. 355. 
14 
at all certain that he would act similarly if they should 
declare a blockade. After a conference between the German 
Emperor and his Nayal Staff during the latter part of January 
1915, Von Tirpitz {Naval Chief) was anxious to initiate the 
blockade. The Kaiser dared not risk such a blockade until he 
could get a better perspective or the real situation. Many 
of his sailors were quite confident ot the results they could 
obtain by the unrestricted use of the submarine. On January 20, 
just two days after this naval conference, Mr. Gerard reported 
to Colonel House that Germany would "soon undoubtedly try to 
blockade England with submarines.n22 
The policy of the British, in attempting to starve 
Germany, had not, been as effective, as that nation had hoped. 
The Germans were troubled by the fear, however, that as time 
passed the Allied action would become intensified. 
The Germans were still not definitely sure that their 
method of retaliation would warrant the risks it would in-
volve. Could their small f'leet of submarines (numbering at 
this time only twenty-four in all) cripple British conn:n.erce? 
England was boasting that she had never before enjoyed such 
security and freedom of the seas in time of war. Simul-
taneously, she was alarmed to hear that a German submarine 
was loose in the Irish Seas and had sunk three British 
22Ibid., p. 346. 
f 
15 
steamers in a single day. On the same day, January 30, two 
other steamers were torpedoed in the Channel not far from 
Havre. 23 All or these were torpedoed without warning which 
was a flagrant violation 01· international law. 
Five days later, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral 
von Pohl, had worked out a plan and a proclamation was issued 
by the German Emperor. It declared, the waters surrounding 
Great Britain and Ireland to be included in a zone of war, 
in which all enemy merchant vessels would be subject to 
destruction through mistaken identity. 24 In regard to this 
latter and more dangerous clause, Great Britain had already 
set somewhat of a precedent by warning neutral merchantmen 
against the risk from the Allied. patrols unless they conformed 
to the "strict" rule laid down by the British Admiralty. 25 
On the following day the newspapers of the United States 
came off the press with blazing headlines: "Germany proclaims 
a War Zone." Just at that moment when .American resentment 
against British control policy might have produced actual 
results, Germany had created a situation in which all thought 
of trade controversy was covered up and lost. 
There were some people in the United States who ex-
pressed themselves in striking terms on the receipt of this 
news. Considering it objectively, they could have seen that 
it "indicated the depths of desperation to which the Central 
23 i N.Y. Times Curr. Hist., III, P• v. 
24-- - -
For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., p. 94. 
25- -Ibid., p. 94. 
16 
Powers had been reduced." The majority, however, held on to 
the view that the thing was too absurd to merit any consider-
ation. Even the British representatives of the shipping 
companies in America were content to regard it as a big bluff. 
From Liverpool came a telegram telling when the Lusitania 
(which was bearing Colonel House) would arrive. 26 The naval 
authorities of England seemed conf'ident that the fast liner 
would not be in any danger. 
In the meantime, we find Colonel House in the middle 
of the newly created submarine war zone. He made note of 
the following: 
Our voyage has about come to a close ••••• This after-
noon. as we approached the Irish coast, the .American 
flag was raised ••••• Gaptain Dow had been greatly alarmed 
the night be1'ore ••••• He expected to be torpedoed and 
that was the reason for raising the American flag ••••• 
I was not an eye-witness to it and have been able to 
say that I only knew it from hea!say. 
The alarm of the Captain for the safety of his boat 
caused him to map out a complete programme for the 
saving of passengers, the launching of lifeboats, etc., 
etc. He told Beresford if the boilers were not struck 
by the torpedoes, the boat could 'remain afloat for at 
least an hour, and i~7that time he would endeavor to 
save the passengers. 
Although the Colonel purposefully tailed. to observe the 
raising of the flag, others did and there were big stories 
in the .American newspapers about it. These stories lent 
weight to the German contention that they could not guarantee 
the safety of neutral ships in the war zone because the Allies 
were mis-using neutral .clags. 
26 Millis, .2E.• £:i!•, P• 135. 
27seymour, .2E.• .£!!•, p. 361. 
.Again the State Department was less biased and more 
logical than the pro-Ally press; un: t'ortunately all the 
17 
Department saw was a chance to express its sentiments. The 
Secretary of State dispatched a sti I' f note to Germany on 
February 10: 
If the commanders or German vessels of war should 
act upon the presumption that the flag of the United 
States was not being used in good faith and should 
destroy on the high seas an .American vessel or the 
lives of American citizens, it would be difficult 
for the Government of the United States to view the 
act in any other l!~t than as an indefensible violation 
of neutral rights. B 
The English held to the argument that the Germans were 
led to adopt their policy of naval warfare by our passive 
compliance, but we let them know that we had .not acquiesced 
by dispatching a note on the same day to Great Britain, 
protesting to the misuse of our flag. It was different from 
the German note, in that it did not state that we would hold 
them "to a strict accountability for such acts of the naval 
authorities." Later, we were to regret this phrase. 
Our diplomatic strokes had been in keeping with the 
rules of the game of international relations, for both sides 
had been dealt equal blows. Soon the February 18 deadline 
was to come and go, with nothing unusual to happen, except 
that Great Britain was presently to exploit the occasion to 
her o,vn advantage. 
28For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., p. 99; N•!• 2!imes Curr. Hist., 
II, 2. 
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The British now used every method at their command to 
denounce to the neutral the barbarity of the submarine cam-
paign. Secretly, they regarded it as a bit of good fortune, 
because they were well aware that the Germans had too few 
submarines to cause serious damage to their commerce. An-
,other English view was expressed by Mr. Winston Churchill, 
"we were sure that [the submarine war] would offend and 
perhaps embroil the United States; and that in any case our 
position for enforcing the blockade would be greatly strengthened. 
We looked forward to a sensible abatement of the pressure which 
'\ 
the .American Government was putting on us. ~ 9 In answer to 
our vigorous protests in December against British trade res-
trictions we received a long drawn-out discussion on Feb-
30 
ruary 12, in which nothing was conceded. They now doubled 
their efforts to starve the German civilians into submission. 
On March 1, our Secretary of State received two Notes Verbales 
from .Ambassadors Spring Rice and Jusserand in which they openly 
prohibited further neutral trade either to or from the German 
31 l!inpire. 
Now that Germany had announced her submarine blockade, 
the Allies were able to announce their off-shore blookade 
of Germany which up to this time had been illegal. Contrary 
to the contraband rules, exports f1rom Germany were prohibited. 
29 Millis, .2.E.• cit., p. 137. 
30 For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., pp. 324-334. 
31For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., p. 127. 
--
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The Allies admitted that the new decree was a violation of 
international law, but they justified it as legitimate 
reprisal against Germany's violation in the declaration of 
the submarine war zone. Our protests were unavailing and 
from this time on the United States had· to give up its rights 
of trade with the Central Powers. 
The situation had now reached a stage which demanded 
the broadest of statesmanship. If Secretary Bryan, who seems 
to have held a more objective view, could have been given the 
favored chances instead of House, things might have evolved 
differently. However, these peculiar conditions were very 
unfamiliar even to Mr. Bryan, and besides he did not command 
a great deal of respect from the legislators and governing 
officials. In Secretary Tumulty's book, Woodrow Wilson~ 
I Know Him, the position of the President can be found: 
"Turning to me, the President said: ••••• England is fighting 
our fight and you may well understand that I shall not, in 
the present state of the world's affairs, place obstacles in 
her way ••••• Let those who clamour for radical action against 
32 England understand this?" lfu.rthermore, the affairs of 
the Department of State were being unofficially conducted 
by Colonel House over the head of the Secretary, and many 
matters which virtually concerned his department were not 
33 
communicated to Mr. Bryan. As a result of such unofficial 
32Mz.. & Mrs. William Jennings Bryan, Bryan's Memoirs, 
Chicago, 1925, pp. 403-404. 
33"Grey's Memoirs" quoted, Ibid., pp. 404-405. 
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action, the delicate machinery of the State Department was 
thrown out of balance, and the work of the Secretary made 
increasingly difficult. 
On February 11, Mr. Gerard was busy cabling his latest 
peace proposal: 
It is my oonviction •••• that if a reasonable peace 
proposition were offered Germany very many men of 
influence would be inclined to use their efforts to 
induc.e Germany to accept the proposition ••••• If peace 
does not come immediately a new and protracted phase 
of the war will commence ••••• There is no chance of a 
success if much cabling is done and you formally 
instruct our .Ambassadors to take the matter up for 
that would leave room for the interpretation that the 
:fJ!.timation originated from Germany and not :t'rom your 
@ryanJ instructions to me to use my discretion in a 
matter concerning which I and not Germany made a 
suggestion to you ••••• 
••••• It will be fatal to hesitate or wa~4 a moment; 
success is dependent on immediate action. 
In viewing the military situation Mr. Gerard was quite 
confident that the German Armies had a decided advantage. 
At the same time he was of' the opinion that if it was peace 
which the reasonable men of Washington wanted, they could 
only get it by putting equal pressure on both sides. Unless 
they were willing to do this, they should not act at all. 
In reply to Mr. Gerard, Secretary Bryan cabled him that his 
message was "most welcome ••••• The President requests that 
you will get into communication with House. The President 
has fully instructed and commissioned him (House) to act in 
all these matters •••• and requests you will act only upon 
his advice."35 
34For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., pp. 9-10. 
35-!2!:• ~., 1915 Suppl., p. 108. 
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Mr. Gerard had already written Colonel House, that if 
a "reasonable peace was proposed now i matter of days, even 
hours] it -would be accepted." On March 1, (16 days later) 
Mr. House replied in a letter to Gerard that the "British were 
slow-moving people," and besides "they cannot act alone •••• " 
in the matter. Colonel House feeling somewhat despondent 
announced that "it was hopeless," and the whole affair came 
~6 to an abrupt end. 
As one might expect, Colonel House took care to come 
into contact with every one who might give the slightest 
insight into his mission of peace. His many conversations 
concerning his mission did not affect his deep sympathy for 
the statesmen of Dovming Street. As Sir Edward Grey observed, 
it had been unnecessary "to spend much time putting our case 
to him." From the beginning the English were "in no doubt •••• 
that he held the Germans' militarism responsible for the 
With such assurances the problem of retaining our 
sympathy became a relatively simple game f'or the British 
statesmen. 
It was at this stage that the peace negotiator received 
invitations from Zimmermann and Gerard to come to Berlin, 
stating that it was still possible for peace to be obtained. 
Mr. House could not decide for himself, so he went to Sir 
36 
Seymour,~· cit., PP• 376-377. 
3'7"Grey's Memoirs" quoted, ibid., p. 393; Millis, .2.E.• cit., 
PP• 139-140. 
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Edward Grey and showed him these communications, and on the 
same day had a conference with Prime Minister Asquith. They 
both rejected the terms that Berlin had proposed and said 
until they agreed to the "evacuation of invaded territory 
and guarantees for permanent peace," they would continue 
the war. While in this f'ra.me of mind they advised the 
Colonel that it would be useless for him to go to Berlin 
38 
at that time. 
In answer to Mr. House's letter, in which his objections 
against going to Berlin were expressed, President Wilson sent 
a sharp cable: 
If an impression were to be created in Berlin that 
you were to come only when the British Government 
thought it an opportune time to come, you might be 
regarded when you reach there as their spokesman 
rather than mine.39 
The cable, however, did not change the Colonel's opinion, 
for just three days later (February 2:5) he informed the Presi-
dent that "Germany will use you in the event it suits her 
purposes to do so" and if he (Colonel House) should go to 
Germany then they "vlill cease to consider you ~he President 
of the United States] as a medium" for peace. 
Mr. Gerard, whom the Uolonel is later to characterize 
as "different from some of our representatives, inasmuch as 
his point of view is wholly .American," is still seeking for 
some sort of workable compromise of the trade and submarine 
questions which were so threatening to American peace. 
38seymour, 2£• cit., p. 3?8. 
39i!illis, .2.E.• cit., P• 141 
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Once again, he cabled his expectations: 
You can force England to permit foodstuffs and raw 
materials to enter Germany, in which case the proposed 
blockade will be withdrawn and in all probability I 
can arrange that no further reference will be made to 
the question of export of arms and ammunition. If 
. you cannot arrange with England, then I can arrange a 
convoy of .American war i 0ssels •••• under our guarantee 
to carry no contraband. 
The State Department advised .Ambassador Page to inform 
the British Ministers of' the position of the United States 
Government in regard to the stopping of food intended for 
non-combatants. "That a policy which seeks to keep food •••• 
from the civil population of a whole nation, will create a 
very unfavorable impression ••••• It will certainly create •••• 
41 
a strong revulsion of feeling in this country." Mr. Page 
hastened to inform the State Department that he was sorry 
"to report that I do not see a ray of hope for any agreement 
between Germany and England whereby England will permit food 
. 42 
to enter Germany under any condition." The State Depart-
ment, seeing that it was useless to wait on Page, dispatched 
immediately to Germany and Great Britain its own suggestions 
of a compromise. 
In brief, Great Britain was to agree not to interfere 
with foodstuffs consigned to the civil population of Germany 
which was to be distributed by an .American agency designated 
4°For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., p. 116. 
41Ibid.:-;. 107. 
42-Ibid., p. 118. 
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by the United States Government. Germany was to agree that 
these agencies were to have entire control without inter-
ference from their Government, and that each was required to 
refrain from the indiscriminate planting of mines and the use 
of neutral flags for the purposes or disguise. Neither side 
was to allow submarines to attack merchant vessels except for 
h vi . 43 t e purpose of sit and search. 
The results of these suggestions were other than favor-
able. Germany demanded that unless raw materials were in-
cluded on the same basis as foodstuffs, she would not accept. 
Great Britain was not interested in submitting herself to a 
compromise which thus 1'ar had been a great advantage to her. 
On March 1, the day of the German reply, the Entente de-
clared their illegal blockade. Fifteen days later, Grey 
presented to Page an Order in Council which rejected the 
whole compromise plan, 44 and once again the opportunity to 
take matters into our own hands and demand some regulations 
of the war at sea was lost. 
On March 2, Colonel House received a letter from Zimmer-
mann saying that Germany would consider a permanent peace, 
if Great Britain could be induced to forfeit her claims to 
45 
a monopoly on the high seas. These new issues presented 
to the Colonel opportunities to go to Germany. Now that 
43 For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., pp. 119-120. 
44Ibid.-:--;p. 127-128-129-130,140-141-142-143. 
45seymour, 2.E.• cit., p. 391. 
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the British had firmly established their blockade, they had 
no reasons to fear the Colonel's action, and Sir Edward 
advised House that the time had come when he should proceed 
to Germany. Before resuming his travels, the Colonel com-
mented in his notes, that the main difficulty in England had 
been due to the lack of a "Palmerston or Catham" who is 
capable of "dominating the situation," and that he expected 
to find the conditions even more uncertain in Germany. 
On his way to Berlin, it was convenient to spend a few 
hours in Paris, where conditions were very unfavorable for 
peace. Proceeding to Berlin on March 20, Mr. House found 
Zimmermann sympathetic and of a very noble character. The 
first evening the Colonel had opportunity to talk with 
Dr. Rathenau, a great figure in commercial Germany, who 
urged him not to cease in his efforts to secure peace. Many 
obstacles, however, soon confronted him. Colonel House had 
observed that all the belligerents would probably welcome 
peace negotiations, but none of them "are able safely to 
make a beginning."46 
The day after Colonel House arrived in Berlin, the 
Orduna of the Cunard Line left New York for Newcastle, England, 
with two fifteen-inch guns made by the Bethlehem Steel Works. 
The same day the Adriatic, another White Star liner, 
steamed from the same port "with one hundred and fifty 
46 Seymour, .Ql?.• cit., p. 495. 
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armored cars for the Allied battle lines and three hundred 
passengers."47 Just how much of the Allies' munitions were 
being obtained in America cannot be ascertained, but Mr. 
House, in Berlin , said in a letter to Wilson, "it seems 
that every German, that is being killed or wounded, is being 
killed or wounded by an American rifle, bullet, or shell." 
The Statesmen of Berlin were telling Colonel House that the 
quickest way to obtain peace would be for the United States 
to embargo munitions exports, but the Colonel was so inter-
ested in selling the Germans his plan for the "Freedom of the 
Seas" that he did not have time for anything else. His ideas 
about the "F,reedom of the Seas" were well received, but the 
Germans ruined all chances of success by advertising the 
idea as their own. When the average Briton found out that 
the plan was something made in Germany, they determined not 
to consider it until the last British soldier had dropped 
dead. 48 At the beginning of his peace efforts in Germany, 
the Colonel had been · "at a loss as to what to do next," and 
after ti week of conferences he wrote the President, "I leave 
sadly disappointed." 
The day before, March 26, the liner Arabic escaped from 
a submarine into Liverpool, after two torpedoes had missed 
their mark. Two days later the British African liner Falaba 
was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine in St. George's 
47 
· For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., p. 784; Millis, 212.· cit., p. 145. 
48- -
Seymour, 212.· .£!.!., p. 411. 
Channel. She car r ied a crew of 90 , s::ome 150 passengers and 
13 tons of ammunition • .Among the 111 people lost , wa s 
Mr. Leon Thrasher , an Alll.erican citizen. 49 
The pro - Ally ne wspapers of the Northeast came off the 
press filled with cr ie s of outrage from t he ir astound ed 
ed itors . Did the y h~ve s ufficient r easons to be _so di s -
turbe d? It seems not , since t he Germans had given complete 
warning tha t they woi...:_l d use their only effective means ( the 
submarine) at their corruaand aga L1st a blockade which the. 
I 
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.Allies had orclered adopted to starve Germc:1.ny into su.bmiss ion. 
Meanwhile, the shi~ filibuster in Congress had prevented 
the arms embar6 o proposal from being brought to a vote. Other-
vv ise, it pro ba bly woul d have passed . Its failure and every 
other act of the Ameri cans, \,h ich mi ght have put the Allies 
to a disadvangage , was evidence enough t h~t whatever the 
,· 
Germans mi gh t get ·,vould ha ve to cone by their own exertLms. 
The Germans a cted in accordance by redoubling the activities 
of their propagand a bureau. Such tactics brought a gr eat deal 
of unjus t criticism from the pro- Al ly press. Something~ however, 
with wh ich t he press s hould have been more concerned at this time 
was tha t "nea rly three.;..q_uarters of the d ispa t ches written by the 
.American correspondents in Central Europe were perish ing under 
the shears of the British censors ." It wa s on l y log ica l for 
t he Germans to try to make up for the deficienc y . 50 
49N.Y. Times Curr. Hist ., III, pp . 400, 433-434 ; 
Mi llis,~· cit., p . 146. 
50Ibid., p . 147. 
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With the coming of spring, there came an increased 
demand from the belligerents for the produce of the American 
farms and factories. As the proud sons of Europe marched to 
their sure fate, the United States was correspondingly headed 
to the largest business boom in its national history. The 
orders for munitions during March had exceeded any other 
order which had yet been placed in the United States. The 
panic scare was over and money flowed freely.51 Those look-
ing for a chance to become financially fixed took advantage 
of the increasing business opportunities. 
With a change in seasons, there was a corresponding change 
in the European military departments. They were filled with 
hopes that their renewed efforts would bring smashing victory. 
The last flame of love and peace had been extinguished by 
hate, fear, and a strong desire for military success. While 
passing through Italy Colonel House was informed by Thomas 
Nelson Page, American Ambassador there, that he believed 
Italy would eventually enter the war on the side of the 
Allies when she could see the conflict nearing an end. 
A few days later Colonel House was reporting from Paris 
to Secretary Bryan that peace was desired, "but nobody is 
willing to concede enough to get it." Now that his visit 
to France had been without results, so far as peace was 
concerned, he left Paris for London on April 28. Again in 
51 Millis, 2.J2.· cit., p. 151; Noyes, 21?.· cit., p. 115. 
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England, he was to get consolation in renewing his intimacy 
with British friends and by creating new contacts.52 
The Colonel was disappointed to find out that his 
"Freedom of the Seas" idea had collapsed, because the average 
Briton thought it was a German proposal. Thus, Colonel House, 
was forced again to accept the idea that it would take American 
action to enforce peace on Germany. 
The failure of the "Freedom of the Seas" plan did not 
make more vivid to the people of the United States the reali-
ties of submarine war. The German Ambassador, Johann Bern-
storff, however, was convinced that the .Americans underestimated 
the real dangers of the situation, and. began to act of his 
own accord. His suggestions induced the German Administration 
to draw up a warning to be issued to the press in the form of 
a shipping notice. This warning was prepared on April 22 
" ••.• travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great 
Britain or her allies do so at their own risk."53 It was 
intended to appear on Saturday April 24, but Count Bernstorft 
was not sure that he should have it published yet; so it was 
witheld until he could receive :f'urther notice from Berlin.54 
It would seem that after the death of Mr. Thrasher in the 
Falaba incident the Americans should have seen that the situ-
ation was very grave. I suppose some were aware of the 
52Millis, 211· cit., p. 152. 
53 N. Y. Times~. Hist., III, 413. 
54-illis, .212· cit., p. 153; Oswald Garrison Villard, 
"The True Story of the Lusitania": American Mercury, 
mv, 43. 
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lurking danger, at least the Secretary of State showed that 
he was in his letter of April 23, to President Wilson: 
If we oppose the use of submarines against merchant-
men we will lay down a law for ourselves as well as for 
Germany. If we admit the right of the submarine to 
attack merchantmen but condemn their peculiar act or 
class of acts as inhuman, we will be embarrassed by 
the fact that we have not protested against Great 
Britain's defense of the right to prevent foods reach-
ing non-combatant enemies ••••• 
I fear that denunciation of one and silence as to 
the other will be construed by some as partiality ••••• 
I venture to suggest an alternative, an appeal to the 
nations at war to consider terms of peace. We cannot justify waiting until both sides, or even one side, 
asks tor mediation. As a neutral we cannot have in 
mind the wishes of one side more than the wishes of the 
other side.55 
These alternatives must have seemed impracticable even 
to Mr. Bryan, tor he was quite aware of the note in which 
President Wilson had declared that the United States would 
hold the Germans to a "strict accountability." 
Late April found the President completely occupied with 
international affairs, vitally concerned as to what course 
he should take in the Falaba matter. On April 28, in the 
grey waters of the North Sea, a German airplane threw three 
bombs in open daylight at the American tanker Cushing, owned by 
the Standard 011 Company. None of the bombs caused serious 
damage. The following day the British steamer Mobile was 
sunk by a German submarine off the north coast of Scotland. 
On the 30th, the Lilydale, another British steamer, was the 
55 
Bryan's Memoirs, .QP.• cit., pp. 396-397. 
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victim of a German torpedo in the North Sea. The same day 
a third collier and a merchantman were sunk oft the southeast 
corner of Ireland, just where the great steamer route from 
the United States to Liverpool, passes by.56 
56 N. Y. Times Curr. Hist., III, 434,600,602; 
Millis .2l!• cit. , p. 154. 
CHAPI'ER II 
THE LUSITANIA TORPEDOED 
On April 30, another U-boat was leaving the submarine 
base at Wilhelm.shaven, Germany, to take up the perilous 
journey around Scotland to the Western Ocean. The route, 
although exceedingly dangerous, was safer than the more dir-
ect mine-infested British Channel. This U-boat was conned by 
Senior Lieutenant Sehwieger--a well educated young man who 
possessed some degree of "poise" and"urbane courtesy," and was 
afterwards remembered by those who knew him for his "gaiety, 
pointed wit," and "kindness toward the officers and men under 
him." Under the direction of Commander Schwieger, the U-20 
was guided through the bleak waters of' the North Seas with 
orders to torpedo any boat encountered in the zone of the 
submarine blockade, and finally to patrol and enforce the 
blockade in the waters off' the southwest coast of Ireland. 
There is no evidence that specific orders were given to 
torpedo any particular ship. 1 
On the same day Mr. Bernstorff, German Embassy to the 
United States, received a telegram from Berlin inquiring 
whether the notice had been published, and if not, directing 
him to have it published immediately. Without further delay, 
1Lowell Jackson Thomas, Raiders of !a!. Deep, pp. 94-95; 
Walter Millis,~ To War, New York, 1935, p. 155. 
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he sent it to the newspapers to be inserted as a paid ad-
vertisement near the announcement of the Cunard Line. Had 
the telegram been delayed a dozen hours, the passengers of 
the Lusitania would have sailed in ignorance of the note, 
which was intended to apply to all passenger traffic between 
the United States and Great Britain. 2 The following is the 
exact wording of the advertisement as it appeared in the 
leading New York newspapers: 
NOTICE! 
TRAVELLERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage 
are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany 
and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that 
the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the 
British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice 
the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are 
liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers 
sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her 
allies do so at their own risk. 
IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY 
Washington, D. c., April 22, 1915. 3 
Directly above this extraordinary advertisement appeared 
the brief and simple announcement of the sailing of the 
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Lusitania," American Mercury, XXXV, 43. 
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4of all the merchant ships which flew the British flag, 
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The following day, Saturday, May 1, a throng of the 
passengers' friends crowded the dock to give them a good 
sendoff. There was nothing unusual about the sailing of the 
Lusitania. The crowds waved and shouted cheerfUl good-byes 
to the 1257 passengers as the puffing tugs manoeuvred her into 
midstream. A great number of the passengers read Count Bern-
storff's notice that morning which excited some attention, 
but not a single passenger considered cancelling his or her 
sailing. It was not because they would have been forced to 
wait a long period for a neutral ship, since the New York 
of the American Line was scheduled to sail only two hours 
""' after the departure of the Lusitania for the same port, 
Liverpool. Furthermore, it had room for 300 more passengers. 5 
the Cunarder Lusitania was the indisputable Queen; she 
was the pride of the British nation, and all points 
considered, was a great masterpiece. At Lloyd's of 
London, well-known Insurance Company, she was classed 
100 A-1, with 30,395 gross tonnage, 88 feet of longi-
tudinal bulkheads on both sides, as the first four-
propellered turbine steamship, and at the time of launch-
ing was the largest ship afloat. Her accomodations and 
carrying capacity was about three thousand persons (pass-
engers and crew). She carried twenty-two open and twenty-
six collapsible life-boats with a capacity for 2,605 in 
all. In addition to the 3,187 life-belts, she carried 
twenty life-buoys. Her owners were proud that she had 
been called the "floating hotel," and even more so be-
cause she had wrested the ocean speed record from the 
German ship "Kaiser Wilhelm II.'' Her best speed was 
twenty-six and a third knots--and was the first ship to 
make an average better than twenty-five knots for a 
twenty-four hour period. Sullivan,~- cit., p. 108; 
Literary Digest, LVIII, 64-65. 
5Thomas A. Bailey, "The Sinking of the Lusitania," 
American Historical Review, XLI, 68. 
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They preferred the Lusitania, because it afforded a little 
more luxury and would save them a few hours of time. Most 
of the passengers who were troubled enough to ask about the 
submarine risk when they purchased their tickets, had been 
assured that they need not fear, for the Lusitania would 
be convoyed by British destroyers through the danger zone. 
The Great Cunarder, with a few less than two thousand 
individuals in all on board, steamed down the bay and dis-
appeared upon the waters of the Atlantic. That same day the 
British ship, Edale, was sunk by a . German submarine off 
Scilly Isle. Two other ships were attacked, one of which 
was an .American oil steamer, the Gulflight. Of these 
casualties the passengers of the Lusitania were unaware. 
Another danger unknown to them was the departure the day 
before of the submarine U-20 from the German submarine base, 
Wilhelmshaven. They were not concerned since they felt their 
lives were in the safe keeping of the British navy. 
While Captain Turner held the Lusitania on the usual 
route, the pas~engers were content to engage in their favorite 
pastimes and enjoy the calm and warmth of the beautiful spring 
weather. By this time the U-20 was rounding the northern-
most tip of Scotland, but so far her voyage was comparatively 
uneventful. On May 3, the British steamer, Minterne, was 
36 
sunk by a Germ.an torpedo and on May 4, it was reported 
that ten British trawlers had been sunk within the last 
6 forty-eight hours. Already the Lusitania had reached the 
half-way mark, and if the conditions remained favorable for 
the rest of the voyage, she would arrive in Liverpool before 
her scheduled time. Thus, events were rapidly shaping them-
selves to lead soon to the tragic calamity. 
From Washington President Wilson telegraphed Colonel 
House to get his advice about the Gulflight. In a brief 
cable on May 5, the Colonel replied, "I believe that a sharp 
note indicating your determination to demand full reparation, 
would be sufficient in this instance. I am afraid a more 
? 
serious breach may at any time occur •••• " 
The U-20 had already arrived in the auspicious waters 
off the Irish coast. The same day (the sixtµ day out) Com-
mander Schwieger made the first bag of his trip when he des-
troyed a small British schooner off' the southwest coast of 
Ireland. On May 6, although unsuccessful in an attack upon 
a 14,000 ton Cunard liner, he succeeded in sinking two British 
8 freight steamers on the Liverpool course. As long as the 
British liners continued to follow this beaten path which 
ran all along the southern coast of Ireland, the submarine 
found it an excellent region for its purposes because the 
0"The European War": New York Times Current History 
Magazine, IV, 809. ~ ~ 
7charles Seymour, Intimate Papers 2.f. Colonel House, 
New York, 1926, I, 432. 
SN.y. Curr. Hist., loc. cit. 
/ 
37 
ships were hemmed in by the land on the north which lessened 
their chances of escape. 
Captain Turner of the Lusitania had ordered that the 
lifeboats be uncovered and swung out, since they were now 
approaching the perilous war zone. It was an established 
formality by this time but it furnished the passengers with 
a brief thrill to experience the faint dangers of war. 
During the early part of the night of May 6, the Lusi-
tania received two wireless messages from the naval station 
at Queenstown, Ireland. The first at 7:30 read, "Submarines 
active off the south coast of Ireland." One hour later a 
general warning was received, "Avoid headlands. Pass har-
bors at full speed. Steer mid-channel course. Submarines 
off Fastnet."9 It would not have been difficult to have left 
the Irish coast, but Captain Turner preferred the shorter 
route since it did not involve so much uncertainty in- navi-
gation. Furthermore, (the Captain must have thought) it was 
a general warning, with little significance. 
The next morning (May 7) was very foggy which made it 
·exceedingly difficult for the Lusitania to determine its 
exact location. The crew was corr~ct in believing that 
they were somewhere off Fastnet, the region the Admiralty 
had warned them to avoid. Because of the density of the 
9 
"Mayer Case": Literary Digest, LVIII, 66. 
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fog, Captain Turner reduced his speed to fifteen knots,10 
(which was) about the same speed that a submarine was able 
to make on the surface. Not more than ninety miles away 
was the U-20 manned by Captain Schwieger; also impeded 
by the dense fog which made his activities very dangerous 
as well as unfruitful. The Captain decided, primarily 
because of a shortage of oil and torpedoes, to discontinue 
his trip to Liverpool and begin his homeward voyage around 
western Ireland.11 
As the morning passed the fog rose and disappeared to 
leave a bright sunny day. The Lusitania increased her speed 
to eighteen knots. Another message was received from the 
Admiralty at 11:25 A. M. "Submarines active in southern 
part of Irish Channel. Last heard of twenty miles south of 
Coingbeg. Make certain Lusitania gets this."12 
It was unfortunate that this message left the Lusitania 
in ignorance or the sinkings that had been taking place in 
the region through which she was soon to pass. The message 
did not even state the place the submarines had been last seen. 
At 12:40 there came a final warning, "Sub11arines five miles 
10captain Turner had reduced his sp~ed the night before 
from 21 to 18 knots. He gave as a reason, that he did not 
want to beat the tide over the bar at Liverpool. Walter 
Millis, ~ !_2 War; pp. 158-159; 1!• !· Times 21!!:!:· ~., 
III, 417. 
1100:mm.ander Schwieger had only two torpedoes left and 
they were "not so good." "Sohwieger's log": N. Y. Times 
~- Hist., XII, 348; Thomas, 21!· ill•, p. 95. -
12 
"14ayer Case"; .2:2· cit., p. 66. 
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south of Cape Clear, proceeding west when last sighted at 
10:00 A. M."13 
In London that morning Colonel House was being shown 
through the Kew Gardens by Sir Edward Grey. The beauty and 
loveliness of the famous gardens did not keep the horror and 
tragedy of the war long from their minds, and presently they 
mentioned it again. "We spoke of the probability of an 
ocean liner being sunk, and I told him if this were done a 
flame of indignation would sweep across America which would 
in itself probably carry us into the war," Colonel House 
wrote later. 14 · Soon the stroll ended and an hour later 
Mr. House was with the King. The King and the Colonel "fell 
to talking, strangely enough, of the probability of Germany 
sinking a transatlantic liner." King George said, "Suppose 
they should sink the Lusitania with American passengers on 
board?"l5 
By this time the passengers of the Lusitania were 
beginning to go down to their noon lunch. At 12:40 Captain 
Turner decided to change his course toward the headlands in 
order to get his exact position. 16 This change was a direct 
violation of the general instructions he had received to 
13Ibid. 
14-
Seymour, Q.E.• cit., p. 432. 
15Ibid. 
16-
Captain Turner could have checked his position without 
coming into land to get his fix by a four point bearing. 
It showed lack of confidence in his own astronomical 
navigation, Villard,~- cit., p. 49. 
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"avoid headlands" and "steer mid-channel." The expected 
patrols and convoys were not to be seen, and precaution was 
taken by stationing five extra lookouts. They scanned the 
seas for submarines, but saw none. 
It was not long until they. were sighted. Only a few 
miles away the men in the low conning tower of the U-20 were 
able to make out two masts and four funnels "of a steamer 
with course vertical" to them.l? 
The chances of the U-20 making a successful encounter 
were slight. Soon, however, Commander Schwieger saw that 
the liner must turn in order to avoid the land projection. 
At 1:40 Captain Turner, after getting his exact loca.tion, 
ordered the course again changed to starboard. At the peri-
scope of the U-20, Lieutenant Schwieger saw that his guess 
had been correct, "It made it possible for us to approach 
for a shot," he later noted in his log. He ordered full 
speed on the motors and headed the submarine in a northerly 
direction in order to reach the right position.18 
The Lusitania was held upon her course for an unusually 
long time in order that one of her junior officers could get 
a "four point bearing" on the Old Head of Kinsale.19 A most 
dangerous proceeding this was in the submarine infested 
17 Facsimile and exact translation of Commander Schwieger's 
official log is given in the N.!. Times~-!!!!.!•, 
loc. cit. 
18N.Y~imes Curr.!!.!..:!!•, XII, 348-349. 
19- -
"Mayer Case", 21?.· cit., p. 66. 
4l 
waters. Furthermore, Captain Turner had been told that one 
of the most effective means of preventing a submarine from 
getting in position for an attack was to zigzag.20 Un-
fortunately, he labored under the impression "that it was 
only when you saw a submarine that you should zigzag.n21 
It is not difficult to see that a ship would not have time 
to zigzag after a submarine was observed in its vicinity. 
From the time of sighting the Lusitania, Lieutenant Schwieger's 
eye never left the lens of the periscope and the torpedo crew 
waited anxiously to execute the comm.and when he gave the 
order. The U-20 had now reached a position just seven h9fi-
dred meters off the starboard bow, and as the Lusitania began 
to cross the hair-lines of Captain Schwieger's periscope he 
issued orders to fire. 
Leslie N. Morton, an extra lookout on the starboard side 
of the forecastle head .of the Lusitania, suddenly saw some-
thing streaking through the water which caused him to yell 
into his megaphone "torpedoes coming on the starboard side." 
The people on the bridge had ·just time to · see the track when 
the torpedo struck between the first and second stacks and 
exploded with terrific force. It was followed after a brief 
interval by a second explosion which made a very different 
sound and as Captain Turner later testified it "may have 
possibly been internal."22 Captain Schwieger observed the 
20-villard, 2.E· cit., p. 49. 
21 Ibid. 
22-
Millis, ~- cit., p. 164. 
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violence of the explosion and recorded it in his log: 
Shot hits starboard side right behind bridge. An 
unusually heavy detonation follows with a very strong 
explosion cloud. (High in air over first smokestack.) 
Added to the explosion of the torpedo there must have 
been a second explosion. (Boiler or coal or powder.) 
The superstructure over the point struck and the high 
bridge are rent asunder, tire breaks out and smoke 
envelops the high bridge.23 
The great majority of the passengers showed no signs of 
hysteria. They believed that they would have plenty of time 
to abandon the ship. From the bridge Captain Turner gave 
orders to lower the boats which had been swung out the day 
before. Aside from the swinging out of boats, no other 
preparation had been made for abandoning the ship. The 
passengers had not even been assigned to boats, lifebelts 
were not distributed about the deck, and those who had 
gained the deck had to go below again to get them. Women 
and children had already begun to get into the boats on the 
port side, but the heavy list and the speed of the ship 
prevented them from being lowered inunediately. There was 
hope that the ship would soon right itself, making it 
possible for the boats to be lowered with safety, but the 
list became even greater which made it practically impossible 
for the boats to be lowered on the port side. Only two of 
the eleven boats ever reached the water safely, and they were 
damaged so badly that they soon filled with water and sank. 
23 
"Schwieger Log", N.Y. Times Curr.!!.!!!•, loc. cit. 
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It was now evident that the Lusitania was sinking with 
fearful rapidity. The crew was working in dead earnest with 
the starboard boats, and with results little better than 
their companions were achieving on the port side.24 Oliver 
P. Barnard, an Englishman, who was mounted on the flying 
deck watched the launching of lifeboats: 
I could see them making an awful mess of getting 
the boats out. They were cutting and hacking at them. 
The first boat floated away empty. The next three 
were smashed ••••• 
Ogden H. Hammond, of New York: 
The man at the bow of the life boat let the rope slip 
through his hands, while the man at the stern paid it 
out too slowly. The situation was terrible. We were 
dropping perpendicularly when I caught the rope and 
tried to stop the boat from falling •. My hands were 
torn to shreds, but the boat fell and all in it were 
thrown into the water--a dense struggling mass ••••• 25 
Less than one-half mile away there was still an in-
visible witness to the tragedy. Captain Schwieger noted in 
his log what he saw in the lens of his periscope. "She has 
the appearance of being about to capsize. Great confusion 
on board, boats being cleared and part being lowered to 
water. They must have lost their haads.n26 Even Schwieger 
had not believed that one shot would suffice to kill the 
ship, and he was apparently waiting until the boat was 
vacated before he finished her with his one remaining 
24 
"Mayer Case", Literary Digest, p. 70. 
25 Sullivan,~· cit., V, 117-118. 
26 
"Schwieger Lot", Curr. Hist., loo. cit. 
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torpedo. But at 2:25 P. M. he reco r ded: "It seems tha t the 
vessel will be afloat only a short time." It was ~ore t han 
he cared to see; he ga ve order s to submerge and go to sea. 
"I could not have fired a second torpedo into t h is throng 
of humanity attempting to save themselves.n27 Commander 
Schwieger had supposed that the Lusitan ia had sent out calls 
wh ich would bring nava l patrols to the scene at once to res-
cue the passengers. 
Within the incredibly brief space of eigh teen ~inutes 
after the firi ng of the torpedo the Lusitania w3s on the 
bottom in 312 feet of wa ter. 28 Although the Lusitania wa s only 
eleven or t welve miles from Lrnd when she sa nk , only one small 
vesse l saw t he incid en t, and by t he time it arrived on the 
scene it ~as too l ate to s av e those i n t he wa ter. It 
picked up 110, hov;ever, who were in li f e bo a ts and on life 
rafts. 29 In Q.ueenstown , just t wen ty-seven ililes away, t here 
wa s a whole flee t of 3rit i sh des troyers , but the Admiralty 
had is sued orders forbidd ing British naval ve ss els from 
going to t he rescue of torpedoed s h i ps. The s e orders were .. 
issued a fter th e cruisers Aboukir, Cressy , a nd Hogue were 
30 
t orpedoed in r ap id succession in September , 1914. 
Before long the names of the rescued began to arr i ve--
761 in all • . Of the total 1957 aboard , 1196 were lost . Of 
27Ibid. 
28John D. Craig , "How We'll get the Lusitania Gold :" 
American Magazine, April 1937, pp . ~2- 43 . 
29schwieger Log" , Curr . Hi st ., loc. cit. 
30Villard, .Q.12.• c it., pp . 41-42 • 
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this number 785 had been helpless non-combatant passengers 
ot whom 124 were neutral Americans. This was not the first 
time that passenger ships had been similarly sunk, but it 
was the first time that a large group of Americans had 
perished at the hands of the Germans. The thing which made 
it all the more sensational as news was that such famous 
Americans as Alfred G. Vanderbilt, Charles Frohman, Justice 
M. Foreman, Elbert Hubbard, and Herbert s. Stone, the pub-
lisher and son of the Head o~ the Associated Press, were 
among those lost. The fame and reputation of the Lusitania 
itself added greatly to the tragedy. 
CIL\Pl'ER III 
THE LUSITANIA CASE 
The United States was the only powerful neutral country 
involved in the appalling disaster. As one suffering he~vy 
losses we began to make strenuous protest to the German 
Government for its open breach of international law. The 
established rules of international law did not permit bona 
fide merchantmen to be attacked without being warned, while 
a man-of-war could be attacked on sight. Yet, what possible 
jurisdiction could there be for the breaking of this ancient 
law of civilization? Knowing these rules why did Captain 
Sch,vieger not adhere to them? 
If Captain Schwieger of the U-20 had acted on his 
natural impulse and according to international law, he would 
have given the passengers and crew of the Lusitania a warning 
and an opportunity to abandon the ship before he fired on it. 
On the other hand, he had been given general and specific 
instructions by the German officials to attack all ships 
1 
without revealing his presence. Captain Schwieger, fur-
thermore, was well aware2 that to have done otherwise would 
have meant the exposure of his !'rail craft to the dangers of 
1Thomas A. Bailey, "The Sinking of the Lusitania": 
.American Historical Review, XL, 53. 
2Ibid. p. 55. 
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being rammed by the swift British liner. Although he had 
no definite knowledge of the absence or presence of arms 
on this particular ship, he had been reliably informed by 
the German authorities that a large number of the British 
3 
merchantmen were armed, and to have warned this one would 
have placed the U-20 in a very dangerous position. It was 
obvious that if warning were given, the swift liner would 
outdistance the slow-moving submarine and its cargo of \ 
contraband goods would reach its destination. Under these 
conditions, Captain Schwieger had but one alternative from 
a military point of view--to take advantage of his excellent 
opportunity to destroy the e'l'.l:P.mJes ' munitions. 
Apparently the Germans had been adhering to this un-
written law of the seas up to the time of the sinking of 
the Lusitania. Shortly following the incident, however, 
the German foreign office maintained that the Lusitania was 
a British man-of-war and as such was subject to destruction 
without warning. This charge seems questionable and should 
be investigated. 
It was conclusively known that the Lusitania and her 
sister, the Muretania, had been· built with money which was 
borrowed from the British Government at a very low rate of 
interest. The Cunard Company was holding these vessels in 
3 Bailey, .£12.· cit., p. 5?. 
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readiness for war service in lieu of a very generous annual 
subsidy. 4 It was also known that both these liners were 
built with emplacements for twelve six-inch firing guns, 
and, in case there was a need for battle cruisers, they could 
5 
be conveniently converted into war crafts. During the early 
days of the war both of these ships had been taken over by 
the British Admiralty, but the Lusitania was soon returned 
because of her heavy consumption of coal (for the same 
reason she was only using 18 of her 24 boilers on her last 
voyage). This brief detention by the naval authorities did 
not affect her status as a merchantman of the Cunard lines. 
All these minor points do not alter the fact that the 
Lusitania, on her last voyage, was not incorporated in the 
armed forces of a belligerent, and therefore, was not to be 
classed as a warship. Supposedly, she was engaged in the 
transportation of passengers, r reight, and mail. As Sec-
retary Lancing (filling the vacancy left by Bryan) suggested: 
it is only reasonable that, if' the Lusitania had been en-
gaged in unlawful service, she would not have been cleared 
6 
by the New York investigating officials. 
Was the Lusitania equipped with guns which prepared her 
for offensive purposes? The German foreign office i nsisted 
that she was so equipped, but if the German authorities had 
4 Bailey, .2.E.• cit., p. ~?. 
5Ibid. 
6Lancing to Gerard (telegram), Fo.r. Rel., 1915 
Suppl., p. 43?. 
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known that the Lusitania was or·fensively armed, it is 
difficult to understand why they did not make an effort 
to secure her detention. 
In the German note of defense to the United States on 
May 28, it was asserted that the Lusitania, when she left 
the New York harbor, nau guns on board which were mounted 
7 
under deck and masked. On the other hand, the "neutrality 
squad," who investigated the ship the week prior to its 
sailing, was unable to find armaments of any sort. 8 Since 
the locations of the emplacements were known, the squad 
had been instructed to make sure that guns were not mounted. 
According to report, the positions, where the emplacements 
were alleged to be, were covered over with flooring, making 
it obvious that guns could not be mounted. This investi-
gation seems to bear out the German contention that the 
emplacements were covered over by the deck, but we have no 
information at present to prove that the Lusitania did have 
mounted guns. (This point may be settled in the near future 
g 
since excavation of the Lusitania hull is now under way. ) 
If there were mounted guns on the Lusitania, they were 
concealed so well that none of the 119 witnesses, who later 
7For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., p. 420. 
8Dudley Field Malone, "The Cargo of the Lusitania; 
An official Statement": Nation, CXVI, 15-16. 
9John D. Craig, "How We'll get the Lusitania Gold": 
.American Magazine, April, 1937, pp. 42-43. 
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testified in the Mersey anu Mayer investigations,lOobserved 
any signs of armaments. Present evidence points to the 
complete absence of armament from the Lusitania. 
Another phase of this same problem was the arming of 
merchantmen for defensive purposes only. Several ti~~s 
during the early months of the war, British liners had 
entered .American ports equipped with guns which the British 
claimed were solely for the purpose of defense. Prior to 
1915, we held that it was permissible for belligerent mer-
chantmen to leave .American ports, if it could be demon-
strated that their weapons were designed for only defensive 
purposes. This law had been dependent on the fact that such 
guns could not be used effectively against war ships, but 
were sufficient to protect themselves against generally 
11 inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers. As 
pirates no longer roamed the seas and privateering was now 
abolished, the Department of State in January, 1916, reversed 
its policy, due to the changed conditions made by the sub-
12 
marine. If it had been conclusively known that the 
lOThe British Wreck Commission, headed by Lord Mersey, 
held a secret inquiry between Jun~ 15, and 18, 1915, 
in England. In 1918 Judge Mayer of the United States 
District Court of Southern New York passed upon the 
suits filed against the Cunard line. 
11 For. Rel., 1914 Suppl., pp. 593-594. 
12- -Ibid., 1916, pp. 146-14?. 
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Lusitania was equipped with six-inch guns, the United States 
would not have sanctioned her destruction without warning, 
because at that time we still held to the old interpre-
tation of the law. 
On February 10, 1915, the British Admiralty issued 
instructions to the uwners and Masters of British Ships with 
reference to the operations 01' German submarines against 
British shipping: 
Procedure if an enemy submarine is sighted. No 
British merchant vessel should ever tamely surrender 
to a submarine, but should do her utmost to escape ••••• 
· If a submarine comes up suddenly close ahead of 
you with obvious hostile intention, steer straight for 
her at your utmost speed, altering course as necessary 
to keep her ahead ••••• 
Oilers and other fast ships can considerably reduce 
the chances of a successful torpedo attack by zigzag-
ing, that is to say, altering course at short and 
irregular intervals ••••• 
Should it become apparent to the master of the ship 
that the submarine is rapidly gaining on him •••• it will 
generally be best to turn bow to the enemy before he 
gets too close, and make straight at him. This will 
compel him to risk being rammed or dive ••••• 13 
Under such instructions the enemy would not be given 
a chance in many instances to give a warning as was pres-
cribed by international law. ~·urthermore, of what benefit 
was a warning to the passengers ir the Masters were not to 
take heed. As Captain Turner had been given a copy of these 
14 instructions, he must have known their significance. It 
has been pointed out in the preceding chapter, that the 
13The above statements were taken 1'rom photographic 
copies, For. Rel. 1915 Suppl., PP• 653-654. 
14Bailey, 2.R.• cit., p. 60. 
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Germans soon learned of the secret orders by securing copies 
from captured vessels. 
On February 15, tne ~erman foreign office informed the 
Department of S"tate that the British were offering a huge 
sum of money for the destruction 01· the first submarine. 15 
Shortly after this secret was made known to the Department 
of State by the Germans, the British ship Masters began to 
talce advantage of their opportunities to ram submarines. 
Several of Germany's U-boats were to succumb in this very 
wayT-the famous U-20, which had a long list of sinkings 
attributed to its activities, was one of the most famous 
i . 18 v ctims. 
The British held that it was necessary to issue the 
secret orders because of the German practice of sinking 
ships without warning. It is well to remember, however, 
that these instructions were issued three days before the 
German blockade went into effect on February 18, and prior 
to that date there had been no deliberate attacks by German 
U-boats upon English merchantmen. After the Germans became 
aware of the secret orders, ' they held that in view of such 
instructions it was nothing less than suicide to adhere to 
the international law in their submarine policy. ]'urther-
more, it was their contention that ships operating under 
15For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., pp. 104-105; Von Jagow to 
Gerard, July 8, 1915, ibid., p. 420. 
1°Ibid., PP· 442-443. 
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such orders were warships subject to destruction without 
. 17 
warnings. While on the other hand, merchantmen had the 
privilege of resisting attack, the international law holds 
that in so doing, a ship assumes the status of a man-of-war. 
If the U-20 had given warning before firing on the Lusitania, 
and Captain Turner (who had a copy of the secret orders) had 
attempted to follow them without success, it would have been 
lawful for the submarine to destroy his vessel with everyone 
on board. Whether the Lusitania was or was not a man-of-war, 
we must certainly admit that there was considerable weight 
in the German contention that she was not "undefended terri-
18 tory." As our own .Ambassador to Germany, James W. Gerard 
(House characterizes his views as being "wholly .American") 
in a telegram to the State Department stated that as long as 
British merchantmen continued to sail "with orders to ram 
submarines" and remained armed, they could not "be put in 
19 the category of altogether peaceful merchantmen." 
During the years that have elapsed since the sinking 
of the Lusitania there have been two contentions as to the 
number of torpedoes that were fired. There were two ex-
plosions for all the survivors and even Schwieger heard 
them. Was the last explosion due to the firing of a second 
torpedo, or to an internal explosion? Those who hold the 
17von Jagow to Gerard, July 8, 1915, ibid., p. 420. 
18German reply to the Lusitania Note, For.~- i915 
Suppl., P• 420. 
19Gerard to Lancing, July 5, 1915, ibid., p. 461. 
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1'ormer view base their beliefs on the testimony of a few of 
the passengers who claimed they saw the trail of a second 
torpedo. The second and more logical explanation is that 
the second explosion was an internal one. This latter view 
is given further emphasis by the publication of Schwieger 
official log which recorded the firing of only one torpedo. 
The Germans immediately asserted that the second explosion 
was evidence that the Lusitania had a cargo of ammunition 
20 
aboard. This contention and the erroneous testimonies 
probably caused the British Wreck Commissioners to report 
that there were two torpedoes released. Since Schwieger 
wrote his log at sea he could not have had the motive of 
concealing a second torpedo, for the issue did not arise 
until Germany tried to justify the crime. Even Captain 
Turner later admitted that the second explosion possibly 
could have been internal because it had a very different 
sound from the first. 21 Dudley Field Malone, who was col-
lector of the port of New York and the official who carried 
on the investigation of the Lusitania's cargo, speaks only 
22 
of one torpedo in his official report. This evidence 
points strongly, if not overwhelmingly, to the firing of 
only one torpedo. 
The German foreign office was correct in its assertion, 
20The Three German Lusitania Notes, ibid., pp. 389-
420-465. 
21cr. ante., reference 22, p. 36. 
22nudley Field Malone, "The Cargo of the Lusitania: 
An Official Statement": Nation, CXVI, 15-16. 
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however, that the Lusitania was carrying a considerable 
quantity or munitions. Thomas A. Bailey who was privileged 
to examine a photostatic reproduction of the original mani-
fest in Washington, D. c. says that, "in monetary value 
· approximately one-half of the cargo of the Lusitania was 
composed of materials being shipped for the use of the 
Allied forces." 23 Some of the items listed on this manifest 
were 18 fuse-cases, and 120 shrapnel-cases, 4,200 cases of 
safety cartridges, 189 cases of infantry equipment, and 
24 
other materials such as copper and brass. Mr. Malone 
reported that the fuse-cases and shrapnel-cases consisted 
merely of empty shells without any powder charge. 25 When 
the German foreign office became aware of these cartridges, 
she pointed out that the laws of the United States forbid 
the transportation of explosives on passenger ships. There-
fore, the Cunard company was violating a United States 
statute when it allowed neutral passengers to travel on 
this ship. Whether these munitions were capable of being 
exploded is a question on which there is not full agreement. 
Mr. Malone in a letter to the Nation in 1923 wrote: 
Back in President Taft's Administration ordinance 
experts of the Government had ruled that such small-
arms ammunition could not be exploded by 1'1re or con-
cussion and, theref ore, could be carried safely on 
passenger ships. But a theory has been frequently 
23rt was requested of Mr. Bailey to not state where this 
document is found, Bailey, .21?.• ~., P• 61. 
24Bailey, 1.£2.• cit.; "Mayer Case" Literary Digest, 
LVIII, 65. 
25Ibid.; Bailey, 12.£• .211• 
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advanced that the torpedo striking the Lusitania and 
making contact with this particular consignment of 
cartridges might have generated enough heat, together 
with the shock simultaneously to explode all this 
black powder, even though the powder was protected by 
the metal coverin r;s of the individual 9!ll'tridges. 
As to the probabl~ accuracy of this theory, I know 
nothing.26 
In this same let1;er Mr. Malone admitted the possibility 
that other explosives could have been on board of which he 
was not aware. He said, "It would have been impossible to 
· discover absolutely whether there were explosives on the 
Lusitania or on other ships unless such explosives were 
enumerated on the manifests of the ships or unless some 
suspicious circumstance attracted the attention of the men 
of the Neutrality Squad."27 This judgment was based upon 
the impracticability of opening the tremendous amount of 
closed cases. lt would have required a great "army of men 
to open and verify the contents of goods in closed cases, 
replace the goods, and reseal the cases." 'i'he delay this 
procedure would necessitate in shipping, the expense to 
the Government, and the damage to goods were sufficient 
reasons to prohibit this method of investigation. When we 
consider that the \Jhi te Star liner, which was equipped with 
850 feet 01' watertight bulkheads, supposedly rena.ering her 
unsinkable, went beneath the waves in the brief space of 
2°Malone, loc. cit. 
27Malone, loo~ cit. 
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eighteen minutes after being torpedoed, we are not so prone 
to doubt the exploding munition theory. On the other hand, 
Captain Schwieger had observed that in torpedoing much 
smaller ships one torpedo did not suffice to sink them, and 
after the firing of a second shot they sank very slowly. 
Even though the exploding munition theory is very strong the 
possibility ot an explosion rrom the boilers or rrom coal-
dust must not be disregarded. 
In the Lusitania note of May 29, the verman roreign 
office also claimed that the Lusi~ania on her last voyage, 
as well as on former occasions, had 0anadian troops on 
board. As a transport in the service of an enemy, uermany 
believed she was acting in self defense in destroying the 
28 
ship without warning. It is not feasible that the 
Canadian authorities would have resorted to such a clumsy 
way of transporting their troops. Such a body of men even 
without uniforms could not have escaped the attention of 
the port officials or the officers on the Lusitania. 29 In 
reply to the German note, Secretary Lansing invited the 
Imperial German Goverrunent to present any convincing evi-
dence which it possessed that the officials of the Govern-
ment of the United States had been negligent in performing 
30 its duties. 
28For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., p. 420. 
29The Lusitania officers testified in the Mersey 
Investigation that the steamer was transporting no 
troops, Bailey, .2:2.• cit., p. 63. 
30For. Rel. 1915 Suppl., p. 437. 
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Even though many years have elapsed since the sinking 
of the Lusitania, certain myths are still held in regard to 
the disaster. For example, Frederick Palm.er in his three-
volume biography of Newton Q.• Baker, revives in these words 
the sinking of the great Cunarder: "That the sinking had 
been premeditated was proved by the warning of April 29, 
from the German foreign office to Americans, not to sail 
on the Lusitania."31 Had Mr. Palmer read that note care-
fully, he would have found no reference to the Lusitania in 
it. 32 Further observation would have shown that the note 
was received on April 22, 1915, by the German Embassy in 
Washington. Possibly he did not read the excellent trans-
lation of Captain Schwieger's log which appeared in the 
May, 1920, issue of New York Times Current History. If 
he had reasoned more, he would have known that it was next 
to an impossibility for an U-boat to pick up the course of 
any given ship on any particular voyage, since the rate of 
speed was entirely dependent upon the weather and the course 
was changed at the a.iscretion of the Master of the ship. If 
V.ir. Palmer's premeditation theory is correct, why did the 
German submarines not get the Olympia, the Muretania and 
many others? Nev.ertheless, !l...r. Palm.er was not alone in his 
belief, for multitudes still believe that the sinking was 
31Fredrick Palmer, "Newton D. Baker": Nation, CXXXIV, 117. 
32cr. ~-, p. 29. 
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pre-arranged, and that Captain Schwieger was stationed at 
the exact spot awaiting the hour of the Lusitania arrival. 
More than that, the warning which appeared in the New 
York newspapers on May 1, was not the first warning that 
had been given by the German i'oreign office. On February 4, 
1915, the German Government had announced that from February 18, 
1915, onward all enemy ships in the war zone would be sunk, 
and in many instances the passengers and crew could not 
possibly be protected. A second warning came quite indir-
ectly, yet convincingly, when the Germans demonstrated their 
seriousness of purpose by sinking approximately ninety mer-
chantmen during the eleven weeks between February 18 and 
May 8, 1915. Twenty-two or this number were destroyed 
while the Lusitania was on her last voyage. 33 
Finally Schwieger diary and orders, which we have 
already considered, reveal that the meeting of the two 
vessels was purely fortuitous. Lowell Thomas, who gives 
us Schwieger's story as narrated to a rriend (Commander 
Max Valentiner), records the fact that Captain Schwieger did 
not recognize the Lusitania before he fired on her, and 
then only when he invited the pilot to have a look at close 
range, who after a brief moment yelled, "My God, 1 t 's the 
34 Lusitania!" 
33Bailey, loc. cit. 
34Lowell Thomas, Raiders Of The Deep, p. 97. 
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Vvhen the U-20 returned to Germany, Captain Schwieger 
was given a great reception by his friends and other indivi-
duals who had no connection with the government. He was 
surprised, however, that the German Emperor was not favor-
ably impressed with his act, for instead of promoting 
Schwieger, the Kaiser reprimanded him. Many of Schwieger's 
associates resented this, for he, like the other naval 
officers, had received orders to sink any vessel of any 
enemy nation in the submarine zone. Certainly if those, 
who aver that the deed was arranged in advance, are right, 
the Kaiser would have praised instead of offering reproach. 
Count von Bernstorff had a personal reason for resent-
ing the premediatation theory. He had given Herbert Stone 
and Landon Bates, Jr., who were bound for Germany, letters 
01· introduction. Mr. Villard in the .American Mercury 
recorded that the Count said to him, "If I were capable 
of giving letters to those two young men, knowing that they 
were going to their deaths •••• I ought to be taken out of 
35 this embassy and hung to the nearest lamp post." Later 
Herbert Stone's father, Melville Stone, (with all the 
resources of the Associated Press to back him) made a 
thorough investigation and absolved Count Bernstorff of 
36 
any guilt of his son's death. In the light of such 
35oswald Garrison Villard, "The True Story of the 




facts, the idea that the Germans sent the U-20 to the 
Irish Seas to await the coming of the Lusitania is simply 
absurd. Today we only recall these ideas to show how 
violently emotional the average person was at the time. 
Although Captain Turner's disregard for orders and 
lack of precaution in handling the Lusitania were discussed 
to some extent in the preceding chapter, it is necessary 
to reconsider this question in the light of other factors. 
During the Lord Mersey's investigation, Captain Turner re-
vealed that he had been instructed by wireless messages 
sent out by the British Ad.miralty to avoid headlands and 
steer mid-channel, to zigzag, and to proceed at high speed. 
In every instance the Captain admitted that he had disre-
garded these instructions. ·when torpedoed he was on the 
usual route not more than twelve miles off the Old Head of 
Kinsale. He explained that it was necessary to come in 
close to land in order that he mie-,ht get his exact position 
before proceeding into St. George's Channel. The Captain's 
anxiety to get his location by a shore bearing, when he 
admitted that he could have checked his position by cross-
bearing, without coming into the land, shows a lack of 
confidence in his own astronomical navigation. Captain 
Turner had reduced his speed from twenty-one to eighteen 
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knots in order that he would not have to be loafing around 
the Liverpool bar where there was danger of being exposed 
37 
to submarine attacks. It was brought out in the Mersey 
hearing that he could have obtained the same results by 
going at I'UJ.l spt::Jeu on the mid-channel course. One of the 
grim aspects of the catastrophe was that up to this time in 
the war at sea no ships had been torpedoed which ran at a 
38 
speed of twenty-one knots or better. Near the end of 
the hearing Captain Turner confessed that he had mis-inter-
preted the Admiralty orders to zigzag, as he was of the 
impression that it was only necessary to zigzag after 
sighting a submarine.jg This was certainly a fatal mistake. 
In the same British tribunal such naval officers as 
Admiral Sir F. s. Inglefield, Lieutenant-Commander H. J. 
Hearn, Captain John Spedding, and Captain David Davies, 
who were associated with Lord Mersey in the inquiry, held 
that the responsibility for the deed should not be placed 
on Cr•ptain Turner. Lord 1,lersey recognized, however·, that 
Captain Turner had failed to carry out the orders of the 
Admiralty, but he did not believe that the instructions 
were intended to keep the Captain 1'rom exercising his 
superior judgment in d11'ricult situations which might often 
37The European War", New York Times Current History, 
III, 417. 
38villard, loc. cit. 
39Bailey, o;.-ci:;:: p. 69; Walter Millis, ~ To 
War, p. 163; Cf. ante., p. 44. 
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arise in the navigation 01· his ship. Also, Lord Mersey 
maintained that Captain Turner's omission to follow advice 
could not be attributed to incompetence or negligence, since 
he was skilled and experienced in the art of sailing. He, 
likewise, shared the same belief as the naval officers who 
were associated with him in the inquiry, and went so far 
as to lay the whole blame of the catastrophe on those who 
plotted and committed the crime. 40 
It was not advice, however, which Captain Turner dis-
obeyed, but specific instructions from the British Admiralty. 
The British Government withheld the publication of the pro-
ceedings of the secret inquiry in order that the Germans 
might not get the Admiralty's orders as to the behavior of 
ships when submarines were near. This was not the only 
motive the English Government had in mind since they knew 
that the Germans were in possession of the secret orders 
prior to the sinking of the Lusitania. It was a perfectly 
legitimate reason, however, for withholding publication. 
This served Captain Turner exceedingly well, since the 
proceedings were not made public until long after the people 
had ceased to be interested. Of course, it is well to rem-
ember that these decisions might have been somewhat modified 
40cf. ante., p. 44.; Bailey, loo. cit. 
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if the Lord Mersey inquiry had been carried on in a judicial 
41 
manner (held publicly rather than privately). Never-
theless, the Marsey report, which exonerated the Cunard 
. company and Captain Turner 01· negligence, was not favorably 
received by a number ot the .American survivors. Neither 
were they consoled three years later when Judge Mayer of 
the United States District Court of Southern New York 
passed upon sixty-seven consolidated damage suits brought 
against the Cunard line, and failed to reverse a single 
decision that was handed down by the Mersey tribunal. 
Judge Mayer said that the "iault •••• must be laid upon 
those who are responsible for the sinking of the vessel, 
in the legal as well as moral sense. It is, therefore, 
not the Cunard Line, petitioner, which must be held liable 
for the loss of life and property. The cause of the sinking 
of the Lusitania was the illegal act of the Imperial German 
Government. tt42 
Following the disaster several of the .American sur-
vivors stated that they had been willing to go on the 
Lusitania instead of an .American ship, because they were 
sure the Germans would sink an .American as soon as a British 
ship. Although on February 20, 1915, M.r. Gerard had sent 
a cablegram to the Secretary of State which stated that 
41villard, 2£• cit., pp. 48-49. 
42ttJudge Mayer Court Decision," Literary Digest, V, ?l. 
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Admiral von Tirpitz had asked him for photographs, sil-
houettes, and further details about American steamers in 
order that Germany could safeguard their passage through the 
war zone. 43 The German Admiralty was probably prompted to 
do this because the British liners (even the Lusitania) had 
frequently tlown the American flag while passing through 
the submarine war zone to avoid destruction. 44 Mr. Gerard 
complied with the Admiralty request, furnishing the time of 
departure and arrival in Liverpool, and a silhouette of 
the .American steamers, St. Paul, St. Louis, Philadelphia, 
and the New York. The latter of these ships sailed just 
two hours after the Lusitania departed for the same port, 
45 
Liverpool. 
There were some people who supported Secretary Bryan 
when he argued that the question was not one of' technical 
rights, but "whether •••• ~n American citizei] ought not, out 
of consideration for his country if not for his own safety, 
avoid danger when avoidance is possible."46 .Ambassador 
Gerard was one of the many public men who was of the same 
opinion as Mr. Bryan. He stated that "when .Americans 
have reasonable opportunity to cross the ocean {jafelif 
43Gerard to Bryan, For.~. 1915 Suppl., p. 121. 
44since international law had long sanctioned the dis-
play of false colors by enemy merchantmen seeking to 
elude the enemy, Germany could not use this as an ex-
cuse for sinking belligerent merchantmen, ibid., 
pp. 100-101,114,117-118,606. 
45Ibid., p. 121; Cf. ante., reference 5, p. 32. 
46william J. Bryan, M~rs, p. 40 5 
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why should we enter the war because some American wants to 
cross on a ship where he can have a private bathroom ••••• n 47 
Secretary Bryan thought that our Government should go as 
far as possible in preventing citizens from travelling on 
belligerent ships laden with munitions. .b'resident Wilson 
contended, however, that under the established law the 
citizens 01' the United States were guaranteed protection 
on such ships, and he insisted on full observance of that 
law. '1'he Germans quickly called our attention to the in-
consistency or this point. "They refer to the fact that 
D,.n 1913 and 19liJ Americans were told by the American 
Government that they remained in Mexico at their own risk." 
The German foreign office could not understand why the 
United titates Government should protect the cargoes of 
munitions by the presence of American passengers in ~ritish 
liners who could travel on .American vessels with safety 
and without complications. 48 'l'hey were not able to see 
the reason that caused the State Department to suddenly 
reverse its policy, unless it could be that the .Americans 
held an intense aversion r·or the \Jerman nation. 
Under the same conditions most people would have 
acted as did the .American citizens who took passage on the 
Lusitania, because they had no chance to possess the inside 
4?Gerard to Lancing, :tor. ill•, 1915 Suppl., p. 461. 
48
~erard to Bryan, ibid., p. 402. 
., 
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information and foresight that Secretary Bryan, Mr. Gerard, 
and a tew others held. As far as our responsibility for 
the American loss is concerned, even these few did not 
exert much effort to make the public see that the responsi-
bility should not be placed on the misinformed passengers, 
but on the government which failed to make available the 
facts which it possessed. 
It was widely felt in America, as well as in England, 
that the British authorities were guilty of criminal neg-
ligence for allowing the tragedy to occur. The public of 
both nations felt that the Secretary of the Admiralty should 
have had convoys out to protect the liner, in spite of his 
policy of providing none. Even the Morning EQ.!! (London) 
expressed the belief that it was not an impossibility to 
convoy special merchantmen "because it is well known that 
many liner routes are protected by fast cruisers and des-
troyers •••• ", and the Admiralty could have made an excep-
tion in the case of the Lusitania.49 Certainly he would 
have been justified if such action had been taken. To 
add emphasis to this argument, it is well to point out 
that Winston Churchill, under heavy questioning, admitted 
before the House of Commons that the Admiralty had sent out 
49 The London "Morning Post" is quoted in the Outlook, 
ex, 112. 
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convoys on two different occasions to protect British freight-
ers loaded with .American horses.50 
Whether or not the Cunard Company or the Admiralty can 
be held responsible, the fact remains that Captain Turner 
jeopardized his ship unnecessarily and contributed to the 
disaster--unintentionally, of course. On a bright and sunny 
day the Lusitania was steaming at reduced speed, tollowing 
the beaten course near headlands which were known to be 
submarine infested. She did not have escorts, she was not 
zigzagging, and was not in mid-channel. The German foreign 
office view was that .Americans could not expect to be pro-
tected as long as they made themselves living shields tor 
cargoes of munitions.51 They went so far as to charge the 
British Government with making no attempt to protect the 
Lusitania because of the belief that her destruction would 
bring the United States into the war against Germany. This 
view was held by the Kaiser, and was generally accepted 
throughout Germany.52 It is interesting to note that the 
editorials in the London Times, the day following the sink-
ing of the Lusitania, devoted plenty of space to the dis-
cussion of what the United States'reaction would be to the 
disaster, and very little space to the expression of regret 
50 Bailey, 21!• cit., p. 70. 
51von Jagow to Gerard, May 28, July 8, 1915, For. Rel., 
1915 Suppl., pp. 420, 465. 
52 Gerard to Lancing, May 6, 1916, For.~., 1916 
Suppl., p. 260. 
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tor the loss of lives.53 So far, however, there has been 
no definite evidence presented that would prove the theory. 
In view of the foregoing facts, it becomes much easier 
to see why the German foreign office contended that it 
acted "in just self defense" when it attempted "to protect 
the lives ot its soldiers by destroying ammunition destined 
for the enemy with means of war at its command."54 Great 
Britain thought that the peculiar situation justified 
adopting exceptional "measures in order to prevent commodi-
ties of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany ••••• " 
Although it seemed to her sufficient reason for the accept-
ance of such a measure, she was not willing to see Germany 
take the same privilege in her submarine war. England was 
certain that no interpretation or modification of inter-
national law should ever allow the torpedoing of passenger 
liners without warning because it was a violation of a 
sacred right of humanity. 
International lawyers have been divided on the question 
regarding the legality of the incident of May 7, 1915. Some 
hold that if the question of reprisal is left out, and 
assume that the Lusitania was not a man-of-war, her sinking 
was a clear violation of international law. Others claim 
that her destruction was justified reprisal for the Allies 
53 Villard, Ell· cit., p. 51. 
54 For. Rel., 1915 Suppl., p. 420. 
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attempt to starve out Germany; their sympathy or lack ot 
sympathy for the Central Powers and their nationality de-
termining to which theory they adhere. Count Bernstorft in 
an official note to Lancing (February 4, 1916) admitted, 
however, that "retaliation must not aim at other than enemy 
subjects," and agreed to make reparation for loss of American 
citizens on the Lusitania by "payment of a suitable 1ndem-
ni ty. n55 
Thus far, the chapter has dealt with the actual facts 
of the disaster. Looking at the situation from the diplo-
matic side we find that up to the time of the incident, 
Germany had found the neutral world resigned, and somewhat 
complacent in the fact of invasion of their neutral rights 
by the British Government. It was only reasonable for 
Germany to expect this same lack of interest to prevail 
should she break an international rule by putting her sub-
marine blockade into effect. Of course, the Germans' flaw 
in reasoning was due to their inability to recognize that 
nations would tolerate the breaking of many of their prop-
erty rights, but no nation at this stage of civilization 
would stand idly by and see its citizens murdered without 
taking steps to check the policy which caused their death. 
55 
Bernstorff to Lancing, For. E!l•, 1916 Suppl. p. 157. 
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We know today that some of the thinking men of Germany 
were conscious of the results of the unrestricted use of 
the submarine. These men unfortunately were not the ones 
who determined the policy that was followed. The initiation 
of the unrestrained submarine operation · 1s one of the great 
incidents of the war. No more significance was given to 
the invasion of Belgium. Both decisions were products of 
similar ideas and led to similar results. The French 
fortifications left Germany only one avenue of attack which 
would promise swift victory, and she took it. Invasion of 
Belgium by the Germans meant the sure entrance of Great 
Britain into the war on the side of the Allies. The superior 
naval force of Great Britain left Germany only one weapon on 
the seas--the submarine. The unrestricted use of this weapon 
brought many of the neutral nations into the war against her 
at a moment when a favorable peace was not beyond her reach. 56 
The German Submarine policy, like the invasion of 
Belgium, failed to achieve its main purpose. After this 
policy had been expressed in the Lusitania Massacre of May?, 
there was little possibility that the United States would 
come to grave disagreement with Great Britain for her res-
triction of American trade with Germany. The dispute be-
tween the Allies and the United States was excluded by the 
56 Frank H. Simond, History .2f. World War, New York, 




more vital disagreement with Germany. From this time on, 
Germany became more and more involved, while the Allies 
felt a slacking of American protests. Soon the whole 
question was German-American, and the United States began 
insisting (regardless of what the price might be) that 
Germany must abandon a policy which endangered .American 
lives and property. Great Britain was certain that the 
Lusitania catastrophe would bring the United States into 
the war, and were very much disappointed because we did not 
enter the struggle immediately. One thing remains to be 
said. The incident was a Godsend to the Allies, since it 
meant the complete collapse of the German propaganda cam-
paign in the United States, gave the American preparedness 
move a great boost, and while it was not the direct cause 
of American entrance into the war, it added a strong im-
petus to the abnormal state of mind which prepared her for 
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